Article: The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on Tuesday added seven individuals and entities from Iran, Russia, Italy and Nigeria to its non-proliferation sanctions list, aiming to choke a cross-border procurement network that supplies the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The designations freeze any U.S.-based assets and bar U.S. persons from dealing with the listed parties, while warning foreign banks that they could face secondary sanctions for facilitating transactions.

Why the sanctions matter

The IRGC’s weapons programs have long relied on overseas supply chains to obtain components that are hard to source domestically. By singling out a “multinational procurement network,” the Treasury is trying to deny Tehran the parts and expertise it needs to sustain those programs. The move also signals that the United States is willing to extend pressure beyond Iran’s borders, pulling in actors in Russia, Italy and Nigeria who have been linked to the same supply chain.

How the network was built

  • Behrouz Namazi, general director of Iran’s Nika Jet Company, is identified as a primary conduit for the IRGC’s purchases.
  • Mariya Vladimirovna Selina and Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin, both employed by Russian firm Avratek OOO, act as procurement agents for Namazi.
  • Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited, a Nigerian firm, serves as an intermediary.
  • Dounia Ettaib in Italy is linked to the same procurement activities, though the announcement does not detail her role.

All seven designations fall under Executive Order 13382, which targets “persons who contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” The order gives OFAC broad authority to block assets, restrict transactions and threaten secondary sanctions against non-U.S. financial institutions that aid the listed parties.

What came before

The latest round follows sanctions announced in May and June that focused on networks tied to the IRGC and a separate entity known as the Centre for Innovation and Technology Cooperation. Those earlier measures targeted groups moving man-portable air-defence systems—short-range missiles that can threaten aircraft and drones. The new designations broaden the scope to include a wider set of actors and a more diverse geographic footprint.

Stakes for the players involved

  • For the IRGC, tighter controls on procurement could slow the acquisition of critical components, potentially delaying weapon development or forcing the corps to turn to less reliable sources.
  • For the Russian and Italian actors, the sanctions risk cutting off access to the U.S. financial system and could expose them to scrutiny from their own governments, especially if secondary sanctions are applied.
  • For the Nigerian intermediary, the impact may be immediate: any U.S. dollar transactions could be blocked, and partner banks may refuse to process payments to avoid secondary penalties.

The broader message is clear: the United States will not limit its enforcement to Iranian entities alone; any foreign firm that facilitates the IRGC’s procurement can be targeted.